tion of these neural mechanisms allows us to share actions, intentions, Gallese is quite explicit in arguing that his own notion of embodied sim-To sum up, and to quote another mirror neuron theorist, the discovery It should be noted though, and this is an aspect of Gurwitsch's proposal that I will be unable to pursue further in this context, that Gurwitsch ultimately questions whether an understanding of expressive phenomena constitutes the most fundamental dimension of social cognition. In his view, such an understanding is founded on a more fundamental conviction about the existence of others (Gurwitsch 1979, 32-33) .
like motor mimicry or emotional contagion. Stein is also known for criticizing Lipps for conflating empathy (Einfühlung) with a feeling of oneness (Einsfühlung), i.e., of taking empathy to involve a complete identification of observer and observed. More recently, however, Stueber has argued that this specific criticism of Stein is based on a too uncharitable interpretation of Lipps' statements (Stueber 2006, 8) .
to the issue also suggests that it continued to remain a problem for him, and 
30
It has ramifications for a transcendental theory of the objective world (Hua 31 15/5). But important as this dimension of the problem might be, it is one 32 l will by and large ignore in the following. My focus will squarely be on 33 the problem of how we experience others, since it is on this level that any meaningful comparison with the proponents of embodied simulation must 1 be situated.
like the signitive acts, they intend the object indirectly. Whereas signitive 23 acts intend the object via a contingent representation (a linguistic sign), 24 pictorial acts intend the object via a representation (picture) which bears 25 a certain resemblance to the object as seen from a certain perspective. It 26 is only the actual perception, however, which gives us the object directly.
27
This is the only type of intention which presents us with the object itself 28 in its bodily presence (leibhaftig), or, as Husserl says, in propria persona.
29
The tricky question is where to place empathy within this classification.
30
The answer provided by Husserl is remarkably consistent throughout his 31 career, though it is an answer that remains characterized by an important vacillation. Already in Logische Untersuchungen Husserl wrote that com-1 mon speech credits us with percepts of other people's inner experiences, 2 we so to speak see their anger or pain. As he then goes on to say, such talk 3 is to some extent correct. When a hearer perceives a speaker give voice to 4 certain inner experiences, he also perceives these experiences themselves, 5 but as Husserl then adds, the hearer doesn't have an inner but only an 6 outer perception of them (Hua 19/41). So on the one hand, Husserl argues 7 that my experience of others has a quasi-perceptual character in the sense 8 that it grasp the other him-or herself (Hua 13/24). On the other hand, 9 Husserl also says that although the body of the other is intuitively given 10 to me in propria persona, this is not the case with the other's experiences.
11
They can never be given to me in the same original fashion as my own 12 experiences; they are not accessible to me through inner consciousness.
13
Rather they are appresented through a special form of apperception, or to 14 use a different terminology, they are co-intended and characterized by a 15 certain co-presence (Hua 13/27). As Husserl puts it in Ideen II: 
To strengthen the claim concerning the perceptual character of empathy,
14
Husserl occasionally compares the kind of interplay between presentation 15 and appresentation that we find in empathy with the mixture of presenta-16 tion and appresentation that we find in ordinary object perception. When 17 I perceive an object, say, a sofa, the object is never given in its totality but precisely because of this asymmetry, that we can claim that the minds we 27 1 That we have an experience of others, and do not have to make do with mere inferences or imaginative projections is also not to say that everything is open to view. As Husserl points out, the perception of others is always partial and is always open for correction (Hua 13/225). In fact, there will always be an indeterminate horizon of not expressed interiority (Hua 20/70), and a complete knowledge of the other will forever remain impossible. Such knowledge would for one require me to possess full insight into the other's individual historicity and genetic self-constitution, and this is something I can only ever disclose in part. Just as I for that matter can only disclose part of my own, which is why my own self-knowledge will also always remain partial (Hua 15/631-632).
experience are other minds. As Husserl points out, had I had the same access between self and other, to a negation of that which makes the other other.
13
To quote Lévinas, the absence of the other is exactly his presence as other 14 (Lévinas 1979, 89).
15
As already mentioned, Husserl struggled with these issues throughout 
28
My only concern about this phrasing is that it might ultimately have When I encounter another, my prior self-experience will serve as a reservoir 31 of meaning that is transferred onto the other in a purely passive manner.
32
As a result of this, a phenomenal unity is established. As Husserl writes,
33
Mit der ersteren Eigentümlichkeit hängt nahe zusammen, daß ego und alter ego immerzu und notwendig in ursprünglicher Paarung ge-the suggestion that we should be dealing with a simple form of projection,
23
where I ultimately only find in the other, what I have put there myself.
24
The latter implication would also go against Husserl's repeated insistence Criticizing what might count as a version of simulation theory, Husserl 8 also insists that it is nonsense to claim that I in order to understand that the 9 other is angry must experience anger myself, and that my own anger should 10 somehow function as analog for the other's anger. Empathy is precisely not 11 a kind of reproduction or reduplication of oneself (Hua 13/188, 14/525).
12
As Husserl also points out, to experience the other is not like experiencing 
8
To put it differently, one of the issues frequently emphasized in Hus-9 serl's phenomenological analysis of the body is its peculiar two-sidedness.
10
My body is given to me as interiority, as a volitional structure, and as a di-11 mension of sensing, but it is also given as a visually and tactually appearing when I perceive the movement of the foreign body, it is as if I were over contrast foil on the basis of which others can be experienced as others.
27
To put it differently, the other might be a self in his/her own right, but Anzeige, welche die Voraussetzung (Fundierung) "des Ausdrucks" ist.
30
Erst muss der fremde Leib, und als Zentrum der fremden orientierten By contrast, Husserl seems to think that our primary object in sympathy, care and pity (Mitleid) is the other him-or herself and not the object of, say, his or her distress. To use Husserl's own example, if the other is sad over the fact that his mother had died, I am also sad about this, and sad about the fact that he is sad. But it is his sadness which is my primary object, it only subsequently and conditional upon that that the death of his mother is something that saddens me (Hua 14/189-190, 37/194). More generally speaking, Husserl emphasizes the distinction between empathy and sympathy (just as he distinguishes both of these from emotional contagion). Whereas empathy is an epistemic attitude that doesn't have to involve love, sympathy involves care and concern (Hua 37/194). Though it must also be noted that this distinction is one that is not always sufficiently respected by mirror neuron theorists. They describe embodied simulation as unconscious and automatic, but also as pre-reflective and experience-based (cf. Gallese 2003a, 521, 2007b, 10). Compare also, for instance, Iacoboni's claim that Lipps' work in retrospect points directly at a role for mirror neurons (Iacoboni 2009, 108) . Iacoboni refers to Lipps' famous example with the tightrope walker. On Lipps' account, when people watch the acrobat on the wire, they feel themselves inside the acrobat. And as Iacoboni then continues, Lipps' "phenomenological as long as one is not so naïve as to believe in straightforward isomorphism 1 it is not at all obvious that such accounts can be compared in any direct 2 fashion. For the very same reason, it might be best to avoid the claim that proposal of embodied simulation is really a form of simulationism at all.
22
Let me emphasize that this isn't simply a dispute about terminology. What 
